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Board of Directors.Most recent thought about unemployment views the unemployment rate
as fluctuating around a constant equilibrium or natural rate. Unemploy-
ment rises above the equilibrium rate when demand is unexpectedly low
and falls below when it is unexpectedly high. Fluctuations in unemploy-
ment are interpreted as symptoms of disequilibrium--as participants in
the market become aware of conditions in the market and as they are
able to adjust the terms of employment arrangements, wage movements
offset unexpected movements of demand and equilibrium is restored. The
continuous pattern of fluctuations of unemployment reflects the continuous
arrival of unexpected shocks in demand. The major exceptions to this
view are the universally recognized shift in equilibrium unemployment
attributable to the changing composition of the labor force and the
more controversial claim that various government programs including
unemployment insurance have raised the equilibrium unemployment rate in
recent years.
The inspiration for this paper is a body of evidence that points
rather strongly in the direction of a larger role for fluctuations in
equilibrium unemployment than is generally recognized. Efforts to
partition historical movements in unemployment into equilibrium and
disequilibrium terms have, in some cases, attributed the great bulk of
movements to the equilibrium term, though this finding has not been
emphasized or attracted much attention. Similarly, movements of wages
are so weakly associated with levels of unemployment that the inter-
pretation involving equilibrating fluctuations in wages requires an
elasticity of demand for labor that is absurdly high. Finally, the
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pattern of unemployment rates in specific geographical and occupational
labor markets seems to require an equilibrium interpretation of an
important part of their movements relative to one another, unless dis-
equilibrium can persist for many years.
Fluctuations in the equilibrium rate of unemployment can only be
understood within a theory of the natural or equilibrium rate. It is
not enough to say that unemployment is the difference between supply
and demand in the labor market, though of course it always will be.
In equilibrium, no participants in the market can have an unexploited
opportunity to make themselves better off. At the equilibrium un-
employment rate, employers cannot obtain labor at lower cost by
offering work at below the market wage to the unemployed. Unemployed
workers cannot raise their effective real incomes by taking lower
wages in exchange for immediate employment. The task of the theory
is to explain why any unemployment remains at all when these conditions
are satisfied. Part of this problem has been studied in detail in the
"search theory" of unemployment--once a worker becomes unemployed, it
is reasonably well understood why the worker does not become employed
again immediately. The theory of why people become unemployed in the
first place is less well developed and is the main concern of this
paper. Most of the unemployed are looking for new work because their
previous jobs ran out. Consequently, the main ingredient of a theory
of the flow of workers into unemployment is a theory of the duration
of employment. Such a theory is developed here, along reasonably
standard lines.3
Within the theory, both employers and workers care about the
duration of employment. Duration can be viewed as a characteristic
of a job along with its wage. Then an efficient employment contract
sets a duration and a wage at a point where the isocost curve is
tangent to the indifference curve. Such a point is a desirable com-
promise between the employer's desire to retain flexibility over future
levels of employment and the worker's interest in stable employment.
The paper unites this theory of the flow into unemployment with
a simple model of unemployment. The resulting model of the labor market
does indeed have an equilibrium where the unemployment rate is positive--
under the efficient employment contract, jobs have finite lengths and
workers are continually moving through the labor market. But the
equilibrium is indeterminate. The market may be in equilibrium with
slack conditions and high unemployment or tight conditions and low
unemployment. There is a socially optimal equilibrium, generally with
very tight conditions, but the self-interests of participants in the
market by themselves will not push the market toward the optimum. The
basic difficulty is that a single small employer is incapable of
assuring a prospective employee of a favorable job-finding experience
after the job runs out. However there is a strict upper bound to the
equilibrium unemployment rate: If conditions in the open labor market
are bad enough, employers will respond by offering permanent jobs.
When all employers do this, unemployment vanishes. Severe depressions
cannot be equilibria in terms of the model.
Indeterminate unemployment rates fit well with the evidence of large
unexplained differences in unemployment across cities and unexplained4
shifts in relative unemployment rates over time. Of course, there is
an alternative explanation of these findings, which lies behind almost
all popular accounts and strongly influences economists as well-- labor
markets are in perpetual disequilibrium, observed differentials reflect
alternative levels of demand, and wages never adjust to clear the
markets. Under this explanation, employers are ignorant of the possi-
bility of obtaining labor at below the prevailing wage in slack markets
or they are prohibited from doing so. The believer in permanent dis-
equilibrium and permanent unexploited opportunities for profit will not
be convinced by this paper that there are any mysteries about unemploy-
ment. Rather, the paper does offer a possible alternative explanation
of the facts that rests on economic equilibrium and invokes no failure
of the principle that individuals follow their own self interests.5
Agregate evidence about the relative importance of equilibrium and
disequilibrium fluctuations in unemployment
A partitioning of the variance of measured unemployment into
equilibrium and disequilibrium terms is possible if sufficiently
strong assumptions are made. There do not seem to be any studies that
have focused directly on this question, but highly relevant evidence
is presented by Sargent (6,7) and Barro (1). The essential idea in
both cases is to identify the disequilibrium term with the unexpected
movement in some variable that is thought to be a good indicator of
the excess supply of labor (prices in Sargent's work and the money
supply in Barro's). The residual plus any other term in the equation
then measure the equilibrium unemployment rate. The results of this
kind of analysis give an unambiguous partitioning if the disequilibrium
term has only a contemporaneous effect and no lagged effect. Sargent's
equation 1 in (7, p. 235) is a good place to start:
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u is the aggregate unemployment rate and x is a measure of unexpected
price inflation, constructed as the log of the price level predicted
by contemporaneous exogenous variables and lagged endogenous and exo-
genous variables less the log of the price level predicted using only
lagged variables. The variable x measures all of the new information
contained in the most recent exogenous variables that is relevant for
prices. By construction, it is uncorrelated with any of the other
variables in the equation. Consequently, the variance inu can be
decomposed into three unambiguous components: one associated with x,
interpreted as the disequilibrium component, one associated with all
of the other independent variables, interpreted as the predictable
part of the equilibrium component, and the residual variance, which is
also part of the equilibrium component. In terms of percentages of the
total variance of unemployment, this decomposition is:
Equilibrium component 0.41 percent
Disequilibrium component 99.59 percent
predictable part 90.39 percent
residual 9.20 percent
The various predictors that jointly explain over 90 percent of the
variance cannot be assigned individual contributions, because they are
correlated with each other, but it is clear that the single best
predictor is the lagged value of unemployment itself. Since this variable
is known one quarter in advance, it cannot contribute to the disequilibrium
term. Clearly, under the strong assumption that all disequilibrium in-
fluences have their effect only within the contemporaneous quarter,7
essentially all of the fluctuations in unemployment are attributable
to changes in equilibrium unemployment and none to disequilibrium.
By now almost all proponents of disequilibrium theories of un-
employment believe that expectation errors have effects that last more
than one quarter, either because information takes more than three
months to diffuse through the labor market or because participants
are bound by contracts which specify a quantity rather than a wage
response to unexpected fluctuations in demand. The logic of this
view suggests the inclusion of variables measuring errors in expecta-
tions for this quarter on the basis of information available two
quarters ago, three quarters ago, and so on. Sargent does not seem
to have estimated this kind of equation. In (6, p. 452), he reports
a regression for the unemployment rate in which a large number of
lagged endogenous variables appear, including prices, the money supply,
government expenditures, and wages, as well as lagged unemployment.
Since variables measuring expectation errors would be linear combina-
tions of these variables, the regression includes all possible dis-
equilibrium terms involving these variables. Still, lagged employment
has almost as much explanatory power as in the simple equation reported
above__u1 has a coefficient of 1.22 withastandard error of .14 and
u2 has a coefficient of -.55with a standard error of .21. This
equation does not permit an unambiguous decomposition of the variance
into equilibrium and disequilbrium components, but it is clear that the
equilibrium movements captured by the lagged unemployment rates are an
important part of the story. In a more recent theoretical paper, (8),8
Sargent has argued that the persistent movements in unemployment set off
by unexpected economic developments are precisely fluctuations in
equilibrium unemployment.
Robert Barro's related work, (1), reaches a rather different con-
clusion. Using annual data, he finds that errors in expectations about
monetary growth explain fluctuations in unemployment quite well. Barro
uses the error made two years ago in predicting last year's monetary
growth, not the error made two years ago in predicting this year's
monetary growth, which fits in more closely with Sargentts model of an
equilibrium process set off by a brief disequilibrium rather than the
model of an extended disequilibrium because of contracts or slow
diffusion of information. Barro also finds that the residuals from his
unemployment equation are not at all serially correlated, so it is
unlikely that adding lagged unemployment would much change the results.
His equation does contain exogenous variables that make important con-
tributions to fluctuations in the equilibrium unemployment rate--these
are the fractions of men in the armed forces and a variable measuring
the coverage of minimum wages. The equation leaves 22 percent of the
variance in annual unemployment unexplained. Barro's evidence on the
overall importance of shifts in equilibrium unemployment is ambiguous.
Another study, Hall (4), supports the view that fluctuations in
the equilibrium unemployment rate are an important part of fluctuations
in overall unemployment. That study proceeds by deriving a plausible
distribution of contracts or information lags from the observed stochastic
behavior of unemployment. This derivation is based on the assumptions9
that the equilibrium unemployment rate is constant (after adjustment
for demographic shifts) and that it is offsetting wage movements that
restore equilibrium after a shock in demand. The model implies a
Phillips curve relation between wage inflation and unemployment but is
estimated without using any information about the covariation of the
two variables. The slope of the implied Phillips curve is about four
times as steep as the one found in the data. The paper concludes that
forces other than equilibrating wage movements account for an important
part of the fluctuations in unemployment. Movements of the equilibrium
itself are the most likely candidates.
None of the aggregate evidence is at all conclusive. All of it
amounts to saying that variables measuring disequilibrium have limited
explanatory power in equations where unemployment is the dependent
variable. The conclusion that all the rest of the movements in un-
employment represent fluctuations in equilibrium unemployment rests
on faith that the disequilibrium variables are doing their job. It
is interesting that the money supply, which is frankly a measure of
aggregate demand, is much more successful than Sargent's price variable,
which he hypothesizes to be related to labor supply as originally proposed
by Lucas and Rapping, and is also more successful than unexpected wage
inflation, which is taken to be a measure of disequilibrium in the
standard Phillips curve. One possibility which is completely consistent
with all of the evidence is that unexpected monetary expansion can drive
down the equilibrium unemployment rate.10
Evidence from unemployment rates by city
An earlier paper of mine, (3), argued that much of the dispersion
of unemployment rates across cities must reflect differences in equili-
brium rates and not just temporary disequilibrium. The evidence is
the extremely stable pattern of unemployment differences among cities
over time. Chicago almost always has lower unemployment than does Los
Angeles, and the reason does not seem to be that the demand for labor
is stronger in Chicago. After a year or two, the adjustment of wages
in Chicago or Los Angeles, the migration of labor, and the movements of
employers would smooth out disequilibrium differences.But in fact
the differences persist for much longer. My study, published in 1972,
examined unemployment rates for 12 cities in 1966, when unemployment
varied from 2.4 percent in Houston to 4.5 percent in Los Angeles. In
1974, eight years later, the pattern had remained very much the same,
though unemplOyment was generally higher. The correlation of 1966 and
1974 unemployment rates was 0.69 across the 12 cities. The same 6
cities that were below the mean in 1966 were below in 1974 as well.
Unemployment differentials across cities are extremely persistent--
much more persistent than is the national unemployment rate. Only a
small part of the differences are attributable to different industrial
or occupational compositions of the labor forces of the cities, according
to the earlier study. The data seem to require an equilibrium interpre-
tation.11
Evidence from occupational unemployment differentials
In any year, unemployment rates vary enormously by occupation--
laborers, factory workers, and craft workers always have above average
rates, and farmers and white collar workers have below average rates.
This by itself is not any evidence that equilibrium unemployment rates
can fluctuate; almost any theory will predict that different occupations
will have permanent differences in turnover rates and so in unernploy-
ment rates. However, the structure of occupational unemployment rates
tends to shift over time in a way that suggests rather strongly that
the movements are changes in the equilibrium, not temporary disequilibrium
shocks. Some of the shifts seem to be permanent--the best example is
the sharp increase in the relative unemployment rates of professional
and technical workers that occurred in 1970 and that has persisted ever
since. Seven years ought to be long enough for wages to offset the
changing demand and supply conditions and to restore balance in the
market. The failure for the unemployment rate to return to the normal
relation to the national unemployment rate suggests that the same forces
that changed supply and demand also changed the equilibrium unemploy-
inent rate. Other shifts last for a number of years but are eventually
reversed. For example, the unemployment rate among private household
workers rose slowly relative to the national unemployment rate from
1959 to 1966 and then fell dramatically in 1970. Throughout this period,
there was a steady decline of the labor force in household employment.
Again, the slow rates of change seem incompatible with a disequilibrium
process. In the household sector, the possible impediments to wage12
adjustment through government intervention or labor unions are largely
absent, so it is hard to see why wage rigidity alone could explain the
behavior of unemployment in the sector.
It is possible to quantify the slow movements of occupational
unemployment differentials in the following way: Let the permanent
differences in occupational unemployment rates be measured by a set of
coefficients, c. ,onefor each occupation, i. Let the economy-wide
influences, both equilibrium and disequilibrium, be measured by a set
of coefficients, ,onefor each year, t. Let the changes in the
occupational unemployment structure be described by a residual,
Then the serial correlation of the residual provides an indication of
the rapidity of the changes. The coefficients c.and can be estimated
from the regression,
logu. a'. + +€.
i,t 1 t :L,t13
Serial correlation Standard deviation
of residuals of residuals,
(standard error) percentage points
Professional and .85 .14
technical workers (.13)
Managers and .29 .08
administrators (.24)
Sales workers .24 .05
(.24)
Clerical workers .94 .07
(.09)




Non-farm laborers .94 .09
(.09)
Private household .70 .12
workers (.18)
Other service workers 18 .04
(.25)
Farmersand farm .61 .12
laborers (.20)
All occupations .73 .10
(pooleddata) (.05)
Four of the ten occupations have extremely high serial correlation co-
efficients, ranging from .85 to .94. For them, the hypothesis cannot be
rejected that each random shift in unemployment relative to the national
rate is a permanent shift (serial correlation of 1.0), in which case a14
disequilibrium interpretation seems completely untenable. In three
of the occupations, serial correlation is below 0.3 and is compatible with
disequilibrium; however, these are also occupations where the residual
after accounting for econpmy-wide effects is small. In the remaining
three occupations, including the large and volatile category of
operatives, the serial correlation of the departures from the national
unemployment rate is comparable to the serial correlation of the national
rate itself (about 0.6). Whether or not this level of serial correlation
admits a disequilibrium interpretation is a matter of controversy.
For all occupations considered together, the serial correlation
of shifts in unemployment relative to the fixed occupational structure
and relative to economy-wide shifts is 0.73. In the year after a shift in
the occupational unemployment rate occurs, almost 3/4 of the shift can
be expected to remain; two years later, over one half can be expected,
and so on. As a general rule, these shifts are sufficiently persistent
to make exploration of the possibility of a changing equilibrium a
useful undertaking, though of course a sufficient degree of wage
rigidity throughout the economy could also explain the findings.15
Job separations and unemployment
Though the popular conception of an unemployed worker is someone
who has been at work until recently and is now looking for a new job,
there are two other categories of unemployment that potentially deserve
attention. First, as Martin Feldstein (2) has pointed out, some of the
unemployed still have jobs and are on temporary layoff. Second, the flow
into unemployment of people who have never worked before or who have
been out of the labor force seems to be important. This paper ignores
both of these categories because it turns out that standard true jobless-
ness of people who have been separated from their jobs is much the
dominant source of unemployment in the modern American economy.
With respect to temporary layoffs, Feldsteints tabulations of the
March 1974 unemployment survey show that 18 percent of the unemployed
are reported as 'ton layoff"--5 percent with definite recall within 30
days and 13 percent with recall after 30 days or no definite recall. A
reasonable guess, supported by Feldstein's other evidence, is that 70
percent of those on layoff are likelly to be recalled. Thus 13 percent of
all of the unemployed are on temporary layoff, a form of unemployment for
which a rather different analysis is appropriate.
In the same tabulation, 25 percent of the unemployed are classified
as re-entrants to the labor force. Though there is no direct evidence
on the point, it appears that a substantial fraction of the re-entrants
have been in the labor force in the very recent past. There is a great
deal of difficulty in separating non-workers in the survey into those16
who are unemployed and those who are out of the labor force. The
survey uses a fairly stringent definition of unemploymentwhich may
easily re-classify an unemployed person from the previous month as out
of the labor force this month. If such a person is then classified as
unemployed in the succeeding month, he will be considered a re-entrant,
not a job-loser or leaver. Marston (5) presents evidence on the flows
from month to month in the survey that point rather strongly in the
direction of very brief spells out of the labor force. According to his
data, the average duration of a spell out of the labor force is 8.5
months for adult men and 18 months for adult women, and much lower for
teenagers. These averages include all individuals who are permanently
out of the labor force because of disability, retirement, or household
responsibilities. Those who emerge from the group and become unemployed
are very likely to be those who just entered the group. On this basis
it appears that a reasonable rough estimate of the fraction of unemployed
re-entrants who have been in the labor force within the past six months
is 80 percent. Then 20 percent of the re-entrants and all of the new
entrants are people whose unemployment cannot be attributed to a recent
job separation, a total of 16 percent of the unemployed in 1974.
The three-way breakdown of the unemployed that emerges from this
examination of the data for 1974 is:
Unemployed but still holding a job 13 percent
Separated from a job recently 71 percent
Previously out of the labor force
for at least 6 months 16 percent17
Thus the standard view of unemployment applies to nearly three quarters
of all of the unemployed. As Feldstein points out, the cyclical
fluctuations of temporary layoffs are sharper than the fluctuations of
total unemployment, so it is important to study this kind of unemploy-
ment to understand disequilibrium. But to understand equilibrium un-
employment, the starting point is to study the reasons for job separations.
Most of the unemployed got that way by losing or leaving jobs. What is
needed to create a theory of equilibrium unemployment is a theory of
the impermanence of jobs.- 18
A theory of the duration of employment
The duration of a job is a matter of concern to both parties to the
employment contract. Employers are generally reluctant to agree to very
short jobs because of recruiting and training costs. They also find very
long jobs costly to offer, because of the implied reduction in the flexi-
bility of their total level of employment. Employers facing product de-
mands that drift over time face very high costs to long-term employment
commitments, since there is a substantial probability that the efficient
level of employment will fall t some time in the future. In the extreme,
small firms facing a probability of bankruptcy simply cannot offer very
long or permanent jobs-- it is beyond their power to promise not to
fail. Employerst views about the duration of employment can be summarized
in an isocost curve that permits a higher wage at intermediate durations
as against either shorter duration, where turnover costs reduce efficiency,
or longer duration, where inflexibility of employment is costly.For
reasons that will be made apparent shortly, it is most convenient to plot





Workers are also concerned about duration. Holding a sequence
of brief jobs may be costly becaise a new job has to be found at the
conclusion of each job, and finding work takes time that is uncompensated
or compensated at a rate below the wage. For some workers, all job
changes are undesirable and, for the same wage, they would always prefer
permanent work. Other workers, especially the young, may be willing to
buy added flexibility in their lives by choosing briefer jobs. Both
considerations can be embodied in an indifference curve, though the
slope of the curve is ambiguous. The efficient labor contract between
employer and worker specifies a wage and duration (or separation rate)
that minimizes cost on the indifference curve, or, equivalently, maxi-
uiizes workers' satisfaction along an isocost curve. Three cases can be
distinguished: First, the efficient point may occur where the marginal
rate of substitution between cash income and the separation rate is










Second, the efficient point may occur wherethe marginal rate of sub-
stitution is negative and workers require higher payto compensate for















This corner solution plays an important role in thesucceeding discussion.
Note that it is impossible to portray it if the duration rather that
its reciprocal is on the horizontal axis.
This line of analysis does not actually determinean efficient
separation rate and wage, but only an expansion path of alternative
efficient combinations.For the time being, however, it will be
assumed that there is a perfectly elastic supply of workers to this
market provided jobs give a level of satisfactionequal to that avail-
able in other labor markets. This restricts theequilibrium to lie
along a single indifference curve and so determines both duration and the
wage.
How do the parties to the employment contract enforcean agree-
ment about duration? Legal sanctions against quittinga job are weak.
Agreements against layoffs are legally enforceable but are not wides-
spread. Designers of employment agreements need to provide the flexi-
bility so that a separation will occur when it is mutually advantageous
to both parties (this is the efficiency condition expressed by the
tangency in the diagrams) but not permit one party to take advantage
of the other. This problem has been discussedextensively in the rather
different context of employment contracts where employers insureworkers
against fluctuations in demand. The present discussion will notattempt
much of an answer to the problem, but rather willpursue the implications
of contracting over duration in cases where bothparties follow the
rules after the contract is made. The simplest rule isjust to specify
the duration of a job as a fixed number of monthsor years, in which case22
the only problem is to enforce a prohibition against quitting, without
much assistance from the law. A more efficient procedure is to agree
on an expected duration and permit quits or layoffs provided they adhere
to the agreed-upon separation probability. Of course, an agreement of
this kind is virtually unenforceable, since it will never be clear that
any given quit or layoff is a violation. However, a history of layoff
rates greater than the promised rate will injure the reputation of the
employer, and the same is true for a history of excessive quits on the
part of a worker. Thus the inability to enforce the agreement in any
one instance does not make it meaningless to agree on expected duration.
It seems worth pursuing a theory of efficient duration even though the
resulting agreements are not individually enforceable.
The efficient duration of employment depends on the cost of re-
cruiting to the employer and on the cost of finding new jobs to the
worker. Tight markets where jobs are easy to find make workers more
receptive to shorter jobs and higher separation rates, but impose
higher recruiting costs on employers, so employers favor longer jobs.
Though the analysis of the efficient duration of employment applies
for almost any specification of the operation of the labor market,
it seems useful to carry on the discussion within a particular model
where it is possible to be completely clear about the mechanics of un-
employment and its role in the economy.
In the model to be considered here, there is no private or social
value of unemployment in the sense of searching for the best match of
worker and job. Jobs and workers are assumed perfectly homogerious. The23
unemployed simply form an inventory of workers available for employ-
ment. The model also recognizes the pervasive asymmetry of the job-
filling process--jobs are filled as soon as they become open, but the
unemployed must wait until a job appears for them, which is a stochastic
event that may take several periods to occur. The model also assumes
that the unemployed accept the first job offered, and that if they
receive several offers, they accept one chosen at random.
Suppose that J job offers are made by employers to the U unemploy-
ed workers each periid. The probability that a particular worker will
receive a particular offer is 1/U. The probability that an unemployed
worker will receive no offer at all from among the J is
1 -f=(1-
- .i-U-J/U -[(1-u 1
Heref is the rate of job-finding--the probability each period that
an unemployed worker will find work. If U is large, the term in
square brackets is very close to e, and the job finding rate, f, is
f =i-e'
Since job offers are made at random to the unemployed, some of them
may receive more than one offer in one period, and employers must
generally make more offers than the number of jobs they hope to fill.
Of the J offers made, Uf are accepted. The number of offers needed to
yield an expectation of one acceptance is p =J/Uf.But J/U is functionally








Recruiting expenses will be assumed proportional to p (f)--tight
markets with f close to one become increasingly costly to employers
because many offers must be made to hire a single worker.Note that
the benefits of slack markets are almost all available atf0.5,
where p =1.39,as against its theoretical lower limit of 1.00.Unless
offers are extremely expensive, the socially optimal job-findingrate
f will be well above 0.5.
The separation rate s and the job-finding rate f together imply
a value for the unemployment rate,
S U =s+f










The model has four variables--s, p, u, and f, but only three equations.
There is a one-dimensional indeterminacy, which is most conveniently
indexed by the job-finding rate, f. For any value of f, the model
describes a labor-market equilibrium where all the flows into and out of
employment and unemployment balance, where no employer can attract
workers and also operate at a lower cost than is implied by the equili-
brium wage-duration contract, and no worker can find employment at terms
different from the equilibrium contract and still achieve a higher level
of satisfaction. Yet the equilibrium satisfying all of these
conditions is indeterminate.
The implications of the indeterminacy can be seen in the following







For low values of f, in region I, the cost of the unemployment
associated with temporary work is high and there is. little compensating
benefit to employers in the form of lower recruiting costs, sothe
efficient duration is infinite--employers offer permanent jobs.The
resulting unemployment rate is zero. Participants foregothe opportunity
to use the labor market to allocate labor dynamically.Of course, the
job-finding rate f loses its meaning if there is no unemployment,so
the main point of the part of the curve in region I is just that no
equilibrium is possible with low job-finding rates and positive un-
employment. Depression conditions of extreme unemploymentand the
near impossibility of finding work cannot be explained bythis model.
Employers are free to take advantage of such conditions byoffering
:permanent jobs and inducing the unemployed towork for below the pre-
vailing wage in exchange for job security.
For somewhat higher job-finding rates, in the regionlabeled II,
the labor market begins to function as an exchange, so unemployment
is positive. Recruiting costs are still unimportant butthe efficient
duration of employment is high because unemployment is costly toworkers.
The curve slopes upward in region II because the positive effectof the
rising separation rate, s, more than offsets the negativeeffect of
the rising job-finding rate, in the formula for the unemployment
rate, u =s/(s + f) A cross section of cities whose labor markets
were all in region II would show higher turnover rates, s,in cities
with tighter labor markets, as measured by the job-finding rate,f.
Further, somewhat paradoxically, cities with tightermarkets would hav
higher unemployment rates.27
In region III, unemployment has the more familiar negative relation
to the job-finding rate --tightermarkets have lower un-
employment. At the boundary between regions II and III where un-
employment reaches its highest possible equilibrium value, the separa-
tion rate s is still increasing with f. In the left side of region III,
the costs of unemployment still dominate so employers respond to a
tightening of the labor market by offering shorter jobs. Duration
reaches its minimum in the middle of region III. As the market tightens
further, the disincentive of recruiting costs becomes important and
employers begin to offer longer jobs to limit those costs. Eventually,
there is a critical point where the market is so tight that employers
findit advantageous to offer permanent jobs even though workers would
be perfectly happy to have brief jobs.
The relationship between unemployment and the separation rate




Region I and IV correspond to the same point in the diagram. At
this point the labor market does not functirn to reallocate labor
over time, either because workers think that the cost of finding
work in the open market is prohibitive or because employers
think that the cost of finding workers there is prohibitive. In
region II, unemployment and the separation rate are positively
related, but both have an unexpected relation to market tightness
as measured by the job-finding rate. In region lilA, unemployment
falls as the market tightens, but the separation rate continues to
rise. Here it is important to remember that separations include
quits as well as layoffs- -generally the two have an inverse relation.
Finally, in region IIIB unemployment and the separation rate move
together and both fall as the job-finding rate rises.29
Equilibrium in the long run
The concept of equilibrium used in the previous section is the
conventional requirement that no single participant in the market
be able to improve his own situation by changing his own behavior.
For example, high unemployment rates cannot be equilibria in the
model because individual employers could attract workers at lower
wages by offering permanent work. But any combination of job-finding
rates and unemployment lying on the curve of Figure 6 of feis no
opportunity for arbitrage in this sense-- the best a single employer
can do is to imitate the other employers and sustain the equilibrium.
An equilibrium of this kind may offer unexploited opportunities
for profit, however. There is a socially optimal rate of unemployment,
and whenever the equilibrium unemployment rate departs from the optimal
rate, feasible activities are available that offer pure profit. If
these activities are carried out, the optimum becomes the only possible
equilibrium, the indeterminacy vanishes, and unemployment need not
be a special concern.The activities involve a global intervention
in the labor market, though, so the speed and forcefulness of move-
ments toward the optimum may be disappointing. Essentially what is
required if the market is too slack, for example, is the creation of a
submarket to which workers can be attracted by higher job-finding rates.
Employers participating in the sub-market could effectively add the
lower unemployment rate to the list of inducements they offer to
prospective workers and obtain labor at a lower total cost. To put
it another way, the indeterminacy of the equilibrium described earlier30
is an implication of the assumption that employers and workers are un-
employment-rate-takers. If employers have an instrument for promising
workers a more favorable job-hunting experience after the current job
ends, they will collectively force the unemployment rate to its optimal
level.
Determination of the social optimum involves a balancing of the
favorable effects of tight labor markets on the well-being of workers
against the costs of congestion in recruiting that tight markets impose
on employers. Suppose that the duration of employment is fixed at its
socially optimal level. Then the optimal combination of wage payments
and job-finding rate occurs at the tangency between the producers' isocost






With the duration of employment held fixed, the isocost curve simply
reflects the shape of the function p (f) =-log(l that determines
the number of offers necessary to yield one new hire. The curve is
fairly flat until f approaches one, where it begins to fall off rapidly
and hits the horizontal axis at a point where all of the cost is con-
sumed by recruiting and none is available for wages. The indifference
curve must slope downward, since improved job-finding can only make
workers better off when the duration of employment is fixed. In addition
to the point of tangency, which is one equilibrium, there is one other
equilibrium at a lower value of f and the same value of s, shown as point
A. Recall that the separation rate first rises and then falls as a
function of f, so for every value of f, there are two possible values
of s that are equilibria. Point A is clearly inferior to the optimum,
as it is on the same indifference curve but on a higher isocost curve.
Because the only social value of slack markets considered in the
model is the increased convenience of recruiting, the social optimum
generally occurs at levels of job-finding close to one. For example,
suppose time is measured in months, the typical job lasts 25 months,
and the cost of making one job offer is 0.1 months of pay. Then the
socially optimal rate of job-finding is 92 percent per month and the
unemployment rate is close to its technological minimum of 4 percent
(all separations generate at least one month of unemployment and the
separation rate is 4 percent per month). The model creates the impression
that excessively slack markets are more likely than excessively tight ones.Factors causing movement to the optimum
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The model of this paper involves no externalities. An employer
who induces a worker to enter a market with unemployment paysthe full
social cost of the unemployment in the form of a wage premiumto the
worker. If employers could manipulate the unemployment rate aswell
as the wage and duration of employment, the social optimumwould be
the only possible equilibrium.The equilibrium at non-optimal job-finding
rates arises because atomisitic employers cannot guaranteetheir workers
a favorable experience in the job market afterthe present job ends.
With respect to a single job and worker, the only instrumentavailable
for limiting exposure to adverse conditions in the marketis increased
duration of employment, and in equilibrium duration has alreadybeen
setat its best value.
In order to take advantage of the lower cost of laboravailable
at the optimal job-finding rate, an employer or groupof employers must
create an institution that will replace the existinglabor market as
a labor exchange. The new market orinstitutIon must be large enough
to provide the benefits of the continuous areallocation of labor that
make limited duration of employment desirable in the first place, yet
it must be controllable so that it does not develop non-optimaljob-
finding rates itself. Perhaps the simplest suchinstitution is the
large diversified firm. Another is the manpowerfirm that acts as an
intermediary in the labor market, offering lower unemploymentto its
employees and short duration to its customers.Macroeconomic equilibrium
In the model considered so far, the labor market is embedded in an
economy that supplies participants to the market perfectly elastically at
a fixed level of utility-- all possible equilibria are points on the same
indifference surface over wages, duration of work, and job-finding rates.
For the labor market as a whole, labor supply is far from perfectly elastic.
In fact, a better assumption is that the number of workers available in
the aggregate labor market is unaffected by the terms of employment in the
market. Still, the previous analysis of efficient employment contracts
continues to apply. At whatever level of utility is achieved by workers,
the combination of wages and duration should be efficient. Further, there
is a socially optimal efficient combination of wages, duration, and job-finding
rates, but some doubt about how successfully the market will achieve the
optimum.
For the discussion of the aggregate labor market, it will help to
make the simplifying assumption that the efficient duration of employment
is the same for all levels of worker utility, with the job-finding rate
held constant. In other words, the expansion path traced by the tangencies








This would be true, for example, if cost is proportional tothe
wage and if utility is proportionalto income. The assumption of a
vertical expansion path imposes no important qualifications onthe pre-
ceding analysis. The efficient separation rate, s,depends on the
job-finding rate, f, just as discussedearlier.
Under this convenient assumption, for a given valueof the job-
finding rate, the efficient separation rateis independent of the macro-
economic equilibrium, and so is the unemployment rate(recall that
us/(s +f)), Macroeconomic equilibrium is justthe classical model
adjusted in a minor way to accommodate a predeterminedunemployment rate.
If the money supply is exogenous, the wholemacro-model can be boiled
down to a single diagram describing the labormarket. Aggregate demand
for output translates into a demand function forlabor that depends on
the nominal wage. The supply of labor, both inthe sense of the labor
force and the labor force net of the predeterminedunemployment, is
inelastic with respect to the nominal wage:
Figure 10
nominal labor supply






The demand function, whose position is determined by the nominal money
supply, among other things, serves to determine the nominal wage, given
the predetermined level of employment. Again, this is a classical macro-
economic model. Most economists would agree that to be at all realistic,
a rather different short-run dynamic model would have to be added to this
to say anything about disequilibrium fluctuations, but this paper is
concerned only with equilibrium.
What makes the macroeconomic implications of the present analysis
distinctly non-classical is that the job-finding rate is not actually
predetermined and the macroeconomic equilibrium is indeterminate in the
same sense as in the case of a single labor market. Different job-finding
rates correspond to different unemployment rates and thus to different
levels of employment and different nominal wages. Recall that the unemploy-
ment rate first rises and then falls as a function of the job-finding rate.





the downward-sloping part of this curve seems' the most likely and
interesting part. Along it, the alternative equilibria, are those with
higher wages, slacker markets, and higher unemployment as against lower
wages, tighter markets, and lower unemployment. As long as f is
below its optimal value, real incomes are higher in tight markets even
though nominal wages are lower, for two reasons: First, wages are
received for a larger fraction of the year when the labor market is
tight and unemployment is low. Second, workers are more productive
when markets are tight because the more fluid labor market lets em-
ployers make better use of their workers by making job separations
less costly.
In the aggregate labor market, as in individual markets, there are
longer-term forces moving toward the optimal unemployment rate, but
these forces are not the result of the self-interest of small parti-
cipants in the market. If the economy finds itself in the stagnant
condition described by the slack-market equilibrium, it may move out
of it only very slowly. Note that the tightening of the market moves
against the disequilibrium wage-unemployment relation described by the
Phillips curve--lower unemployment means lower nominal wages.37
Concluding remarks
A model with indeterminate labor-market conditions is incapable
of answering the question of how the economy came to be where it is.
Tight or slack markets are a matter of accident in the model. Only a
dynamic version of the model could address the issue of what moves
the job-finding rate in the short and medium runs. Nothing in the
model rules out the possibility that unexpected increases in demand
can cause the market to tighten, though it is equally true that the
equilibrium job-finding rate might be unaffected by such an increase.
Obviously the model does not imply any simple policy frontier of un-
employment against inflation to guide the choice of aggregate policy.
On the one hand, the considerations of this paper greatly complicate
the analysis of aggregate policy-making. On the other hand, the analysis
suggests some relief from the terribly pessimistic conclusions of con-
temporary Phillips curves, which suggest that the restoration of tight
labor markets would be accompanied by high and accelerating inflation.
A tight-market equilibrium with no worse inflation may be available
today, though this paper makes no suggestions about how to get to it.References
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